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THE LAW 
A New Approach to the Fourth Amendment 
in Light of Proposition Eight 
By Robert K. Calhoun, Jr. 
It has now been almost two and 
one-half years since the California 
electorate passed Proposition 8 and 
attempted, with one scatter-shot pro-
vision, to change much of the criminal 
justice landscape in California. Despite 
this significant passage of time, only 
two of the many issues raised by Prop-
osition 8 have been resolved with any 
clarity by the California Supreme 
Court: The constitutional adequacy of 
the election process which produced 
Proposition 8 (Brosnahan v Brown 
(1982) 32 Ca13d 236), and the non-retro-
activity of its provisions (People v 
Smith (1983) 34 Ca13d 251). 
While its many provisions present a 
bonanza of potential issues requiring 
resolution by the Court, perhaps no 
other is of such sweeping importance 
as that of the effect of Article 1 section 
28 (d) (the so-called "Right to Truth-in-
Evidence") upon that vast body of 
independent state law that the Califor-
nia courts have developed in recent 
years in reliance upon the California 
Constitution-i.e., whether Article 1 
section 28 (d) does away with an exclu-
sionary remedy for California's inde-
pendent state law and imposes, in its 
stead, a federal standard for all sup-
pression issues. 
It is not the intent of this article to 
canvass the arguments that can and 
have been made with respect to Pro-
position 8's ultimate effect upon rules 
of exclusion (except to note in passing 
that the issue is one which is very 
much alive-thanks in large part to 
the sloppy drafting of the authors of 
Proposition 8). 
It is also not the intent here to 
suggest that the proposition's effect 
upon rules of exclusion can be reduced 
to a single discreet issue. To a large 
extent, it presents as many issues as 
there are rights which are currently 
enforced in California by an exclusion-
ary remedy-for example, a decision 
that Proposition 8 mandates an end to 
exclusionary rule enforcement for inde-
pendent California search and seizure 
law does not necessarily mean the 
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same result for the independent body 
of law developed pursuant to Califor-
nia's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion (Article 1, section 15) and the 
Miranda decision since Article 1 sec-
tion 28 (d) by its very terms exempts 
"statutory rule [s] of ... privilege" 
from its swtfep (and constitutional 
provisions are "statutes" under Cali-
fornia's Evidence Code)" 
The purpose of this article is instead 
quite simple. It confines itself to the 
area of search and seizure law and be-
gins by assuming the worst-that the 
Court eventually rules that a federal 
standard applies to all such suppres-
sion issues. It then goes on to propose 
an argument which is intended to 
rescue as much of California's inde-
pendent search and seizure law as is 
possible. (For most of you, of course, 
there is no need to assume the worst. 
Substantial numbers of the state's 
trial judges already view Proposition 
8 as having achieved such a result and 
are busily applying the federal stan-
dard. This merely provides you with 
the opportunity to give this argument 
an early audition.) 
The argument can best be summa-
rized as follows: The scope of the 
Fourth Amendment is defined in terms 
of expectations of privacy. Concepts 
of privacy have historically been asso-
ciated with state law. State law, thus, 
may still be relevant to the exclusion-
ary issue-not as an independent 
basis of exclusion, but as a potential 
means of expanding the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment itself. 
Reasonable expectation 
of privacy 
Ever since the Court decided Katz v 
U.S. 399 U.S. 347 in 1967, we have de-
fined the basic sweep of the Fourth 
Amendment in terms of personal pri-
vacy: i.e. the question of whether the 
Fourth Amendment even applies to 
particular police activity (i.e. whether 
there has been a "search") is defined 
ICalif. Evid. Code §230. 
in terms of whether the government 
has invaded a person's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy2; the question of 
which individuals have access to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment 
(i.e. standing) has been translated into 
a question of whose reasonable expec-
tation of privacy has been violated.3 
The problem, of course, with formu-
lating these issues in this way is that 
Katz and its progeny have given us 
virtually no guidance in determining 
which privacy expectations are rea-
sonable and which are not. This is 
hardly surprising. Prior to Katz, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was 
grounded in notions of property law, 
so one would not expect prior Fourth 
Amendment cases to be particularly 
enlightening on the latter issue. 
Moreover, to the extent the Court 
might wish to look to a federal law of 
privacy outside the Fourth Amendment 
arena, authority around the time of 
Katz was scant to say the least, since 
the constitutional right to privacy had 
only been "created" two years before 
in very narrow terms in Griswold v 
Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479. Thus, 
as Mr. Justice Stewart recognized in 
his majority opinion in Katz: 
"The protection of a person's general right 
to privacy-his right to be left alone by 
other people-is, like the protection of his 
property and of his very life, left largely to 
the law of the individual states. "4 
And that, pure and simple, is the 
basis of the argument here: that to the 
extent the court is called upon to deter-
mine the reasonableness of privacy 
expectations, it is, of necessity, com-
pelled to look not only at whatever 
federal law there may be on the sub-
ject, but also the law of the individual 
state in which the case arises. (In the 
case of California, that is an argument 
of some significance because in a 
variety of ways California stands out 
dramatically in terms of the vigor with 
2Katz v U.S. (1967) 389 U.S. 347. (This oft-
quoted language actually comes from Mr. 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion). 
which it protects personal privacy-a 
matter which will be developed at 
length below). 
State privacy provisions 
Besides the dearth of available 
federal law, the idea of looking to the 
states for help in defining privacy 
makes sense for a number of other 
reasons. Primary among these is the 
fact that-as Stewart recognized in 
Katz-the states had in fact been devel-
oping a body of privacy law long before 
Katz and Griswold came upon the 
scene. At the time of Katz, a firm 
majority of the states recognized some 
form of right to privacy as part of 
their tort law.s A few even contained 
explicit provisions in their constitutions 
protecting privacy.6 As of today, those 
numbers have increased so that a tort 
of privacy is recognized by a total of 
46 states and the District of Columbia7 
and at least 10 states8 have some form 
of explicit privacy provision in their 
constitutions. Morever, a substantial 
number of states, such as California 
have developed an impressive body ~f 
statutory law9 protecting the privacy 
rights of their citizens. If the Katz 
question really does ask which privacy 
expectations "society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable," it is dif-
ficult to conceive of a better answer 
than those instances where society 
has actually spoken-either through 
its legislatures, initiative processes or 
courts. 
There is yet another-perhaps more 
important-reason to look to state law 
on these matters. As we as a nation 
struggle to fine-tune the balance 
between the needs of effective law 
enforcement and the individual's need 
for privacy in a post-1984 world, it is 
becoming increasingly evident that 
the concept of privacy that the United 
States Supreme Court has begun to 
develop in recent years lO bears little 
relationship to the concept of privacy 
3Rakas v Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128. 
4Katz, supra at pp. 350-351. 
537 Mont. L. R. 39, f.n. 4. 
6Id at pp. 43.44. 
7Id at p. 39, f.n. 4. Cf West's Wisc. Stats. 
Ann. §895.50; Rev. Stats. of Nebr. §20-201; 
Gen. Laws of R.I. § 9-1-28.1. 
sOp. Cit. at pp. 43-45. 
9See, for example, Invasion of Privacy Act 
(Calif. P.C. §630·637.5) and Right to 
Financial Privacy Act (Gov't Code §§ 
7460-7493, plus amendments to several 
other codes.) 
that has developed in a number of the 
individual states. (Probably no better 
example of this can be found than in 
California-a matter which also will 
be developed below). 
If the citizens of a given state do, in 
fact, define privacy more broadly than 
does the present court, and they do so 
in some fashion that may be readily 
and easily determined by the Court, 
then there is no reason in precedent 
or in policy why Fourth Amendment 
theory should not incorporate that 
state law as a separate, supplemental 
source of legitimization for an indi-
vidual's subjective expectation of 
privacy. Independent state ground 
theory presently permits the states 
the freedom to provide increased pro· 
tections for their citizens through the 
independent operation of their own 
state constitutions ll (provided they do 
not undercut the minimum nationwide 
standard required by the U.S. Consti-
tution as established by the Court). 
The theory proposed here is quite 
similar although it differs in one 
crucial respect. It would allow states 
to provide greater protection to their 
citizens by legitimizing greater privacy 
expectations than otherwise exist in 
federal law. 
The difference is that it would 
protect these expectations through 
the operation of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the enforcement powers of 
the federal courts. The states would, 
in effect, be allowed to define the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment. That 
would mean, of course, that the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment protections 
would vary from state to state. This 
should not be so strange as it first 
appears if we are in fact talking about 
the legitimacy of privacy expectations, 
since it should be obvious that, in real-
ity, societal understandings as to which 
privacy expectations are reasonable 
vary enormously from state to state. 12 
Moreover, this "federalization" of the 
scope question of the Fourth Amend-
ment is hardly heresy. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has for some time 
looked to state law to give content 
and meaning to a number of other 
lOSee, for example, U.S. v Miller (1976) 425 
U.S. 435 and Smith v Md. (1979) 442 U.S. 
735. 
l1Cooper v Calif. (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62. 
12Dash, Schwartz, & Knowlton, "The 
Eavesdroppers" Da Capo Press, 1971 
at p.8. 
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provisions of the U.S. Constitution, 
including the Due Process Clause,13 
the Contract Clause l4 and the First 
Amendment,lS to name a few. 
No less a champion of "States' 
Rights" than Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
himself seems to have advocated some-
thing very close to this theory in a 
recent standing case. Speaking for the 
majority in Rakas v Illinois (1978) 439 
U.S. 128, he said (at f.n. 12): 
[I]t would, of course, be merely tautotolog-
ical to fall back on the notion that those 
expectations of privacy which are legiti-
mate depend primarily on cases deciding 
exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. 
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by 
law must have a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to 
concepts of real or personal property law 
or to understandings that are recognized 
and permitted by society. 
Of course, he never refers specific-
ally to state law here but his reference 
to property law in conjunction with 
"societal understandings" which have 
their source beyond the terms of the 
Fourth Amendment itself is noteworthy 
in that property law has traditionally 
13Board of Regents v Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 
564. 
14Indiana ex reI Anderson v Brand (1938) 
303 U.S. 95. 
15Miller v Calif. (1973) 413 U.S. 15. 
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been viewed as a preserve of the states. 
For example, in Board of Regents v 
Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, Rehnquist 
was part of a majority that held that: 
"Property interests, of course, are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they 
are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such 
as state law . .. "16 
Ample precedent 
Actually, there is ample precedent 
for the proposition that federal courts 
can look to state law to determine the 
parameters of federal law. Probably 
the most compelling example is to be 
found in the procedural due process 
decisions of the Court over the past 
decade. 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
the states from depriving any individ-
ual of "life, liberty, or property" with-
out due process of law. In determining 
what standard of fairness to apply to 
state governmental action, the Court 
has utilized a number of different 
analytical modelsP But since 1972, 
when it decided Morrisey v Brewer 
(1972) 408 U.S. 471 and Board of 
Regents v Roth, supra, the Court has 
tended to follow a two step mode of 
analysis: the first step being a thresh-
old determination of whether the 
interests of the affected individual rise 
to the level of "life, liberty or property" 
(i.e. whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is applicable at all); and the 
second step (assuming a positive 
answer to the first) being a deter-
mination of what process is due. 18 
What is significant for our purposes 
about this line of cases is that, in 
determining the first issues (whether 
there is a "liberty" or "property" 
interest involved) the court has 
increasingly looked to state law for 
the answer. 
For example, in Board of Regents v 
Roth, supra, the Court held that non-
tenured instructors at a state university 
did not have a protectable "property" 
interest in their continued employment 
sufficient to guarantee them some 
form of procedural protections prior to 
their termination because the appli-
cable state law had not created a 
"legitimate claim of entitlement." 19 
'6Roth, supra at p. 577. 
17Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional 
Law, 2d Ed. pp. 528-530. 
18Morrisey v Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972). 
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This approach was required, according 
to the Court, because property inter-
ests "are not created by the consti-
tution. Rather they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source 
such as state law." 20 
Similarly, in Paul v Davis (1976) 424 
U.S. 693, the Court observed that 
"liberty" interests were every bit as 
difficult to define as "property" 
interests for purposes of the Due 
Process Clause and that often "these 
interests attain this constitutional 
status by virtue of the fact that they 
have been initially recognized and 
protected by state law." 21 The Court 
then declined to find that petitioner 
had a "liberty" interest in avoiding 
governmental defamation (despite a 
long line of previous Supreme Court 
authority to the contrary)22 unless the 
defamation was accomplished by 
interference with some other more 
"tangible" interest created by state 
law23-which they found not to be the 
case on the facts of Paul v Davis. 
Thus, the Court has done in the 
procedural Due Process area exactly 
what is being proposed be done in the 
area of the Fourth Amendment 
enforcement. They have used state 
law to determine the threshold 
question of the applicability of a 
federal constitutional right. 
It should probably be noted that 
Roth and Paul and the cases which 
follow them24 have been severely 
criticized25 and that the principle of 
deference to state law which they 
articulate has evolved as part of an 
overall pattern of limiting access to 
the federal courts. A cynic might 
question whether the Court is truly 
prepared to defer to state law if its 
effect would actually be to expand the 
scope of federal constitutional protec-
tions. A positive answer may be found 
in a recent prison transfer case, Hewitt 
v Helms (1983) 459 U.S. 460. There the 
'9Roth, supra at p. 577. 
2°Id at p. 577. 
21Paul v Davis (1976) 424 U.S. 693, 710. 
22See, for example, Wisconsin v 
Constantineau (1971) 400 U.S. 433. 
230p. Cit. at p. 707. 
24See, for example, Arnett v. Kennedy 
(1974) 416 U.S. 134 and Bishop v Wood 
(1976) 426 U.S. 341. 
25See Monaghan, "Of 'Liberty' and 
'Property'," 62 Corn. L.R. 405. 
Court reiterated its position that the 
transfer of an inmate to less amenable 
and more restrictive quarters for non-
punitive reasons fails to implicate any 
"liberty" interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause. The Court went on, 
however, to find that the state of Penn-
sylvania had itself created a liberty 
interest. This conclusion was based 
upon state statutes and regulations 
which required certain procedures to 
be followed prior to placing someone 
in administrative segregation, as well 
as the fact that the state had estab-
lished "specific substantive predicates" 
before administrative segregation 
could be imposed.26 Our cynic might 
point out that the Court nevertheless 
went on to determine that the proce-
dural protections actually provided by 
the state were constitutionally suf-
ficient. Nonetheless, the fact cannot 
be overlooked that firm authority exists 
not only for the proposition that the 
scope of constitutional protections 
may, in appropriate circumstances, be 
defined by reference to state law but 
also that this may result in more 
expansive application of the federal 
constitutional right. 
This principle is not limited to pro-
cedural due process cases. A similar 
approach may be found, for example, 
as part of traditional analysis under 
the Contract Clause. Article 1 section 
10 of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that no state shall pass any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts. 
Here again we find the U.S. Supreme 
Court declaring that the threshold 
issue "as to the existence and nature 
of the contract [is] ... one primarily 
of state law." 27 Thus, the contract 
clause essentially throws a federal 
constitutional shield around property 
interests initially created by state law28 
and, in so doing, makes the scope of 
the federal right dependent upon the 
prior state law question. 
Applicable to obscenity cases 
Yet another example of "societal 
understandings" of a state or local 
nature determining the scope of rights 
under the federal constitution may be 
found in the area of recent First 
Amendment obscenity law. Here the 
threshold question concerning the 
scope of the constitutional right is a 
26Hewitt v Helms (1983) 459 U.S. 460, 470. 
27 Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand, supra. 
28Monaghan, supra at p. 435. 
determination of whether the disputed 
material is "obscene" or not. A deter-
mination that certain material is ob-
scene is a determination that it simply 
is not covered by the protections of the 
First Amendment. (Roth v u.s. (1975) 
354 U.S. 476 at 485.) 
In making this threshold determina-
tion as to obscenity, juries are cur-
rently asked to decide among other 
things, whether "the average person, 
applying contemporary community 
standards" would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient 
interests. (Roth v U.S., supra a(p. 489.). 
What is significant about this for 
our purposes is that, at least since 
1973 when the Court decided Miller v 
California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, the jury 
is instructed to make this decision by 
applying statewide standards of offen-
siveness and prurience rather than 
national standards because, according 
to chief Justice Burger, "[O]ur Nation 
is simply too big and too diverse for 
this Court to reasonably expect that 
such standards could be articulated 
for all 50 states in a single formulation, 
even assuming the prerequisite con-
sensus exists." (Miller, supra at p. 30). 
Moreover, this rule with respect to 
the application of state standards has 
been held to apply in federal court as 
well, determining the sweep of First 
Amendment protections for federal 
obscenity prosecutions as well as for 
those based upon state law. (Hamling 
v U.S. (1974) 418 U.S. 87.) 
Consequently, the sweep of the First 
Amendment expands or shrinks in 
direct relationship to the "societal 
understandings" of the various states. 
This is viewed positively by Chief Jus-
tice Burger to the extent that he finds 
"It is neither realistic nor constitution-
ally sound to read the First Amend-
ment as requiring that the people of 
Maine or Mississippi accept public 
depiction of conduct found tolerable 
in Las Vegas, or New York City." 
(Miller, supra, at p. 32). 
On the other hand, this "federaliza-
tion" of the scope of First Amendment 
protection has been severely criticized 
for the possible chilling effect it may 
have upon expression and the potential 
it raises for local censorship and poli-
tical opportunism.29 But the ultimate 
29"Community Standards and the 
Regulation of Obscenity," 24 DeP. L. R. 
185, 190. 
wisdom of Miller (or, for that matter, 
any of the Court's attempts to regulate 
obscenity) is not what is before us. 
What recommends this aspect of the 
obscenity laws to our attention is the 
fact that it represents yet another 
example of the Court determining the 
scope of a particular federal consti-
tutional right by explicit reference to 
some aspect of state law or local 
"societal understandings" and but-
tresses our argument that such an 
approach is appropriate in the Fourth 
Amendment arena where the scope of 
the constitutional protections depends 
upon a determination of whether a 
given expectation of privacy is reason-
able or not. 
Ramifications of theory 
Assuming this theory is viable, what 
would it actually mean in application? 
In a state such as California, which 
has a very substantial body of law pro-
tecting the privacy rights of its citizens, 
I think its effects would be quite 
significant. 
Its primary effect would be realized 
with respect to that substantial body of 
California case law that speaks directly 
to the Katz question. To the extent that 
the CalifornIa courts have made a spe-
cific determination as to whether a 
given privacy expectation is reasonable 
or not and, thus, have provided the fed-
eral courts with authority that is clear-
cut and readily discernible, the 
California approach should contr61-
for the reasons set forth in the first 
half of this article (subject, of course, 
to the caveat we encounter in the inde-
pendent state ground area that state 
courts cannot undercut the minimum 
standards established by the United 
States Supreme Court). 
A critic might challenge this asser-
tion, contending that the body of inde-
pendent state privacy law that we wish 
to rely upon is part and parcel of the 
very state law that has been presumed 
lost to Proposition 8's "Right-to-truth-
in-Evidence," i.e. that what cannot be 
done directly with California law also 
cannot be done indirectly. 
Ignoring the intriguing question of 
whether the electorate really could 
have had something so specific as this 
in mind when it passed Proposition 8, 
let us move on to what does seem to 
be a very obvious answer to our critic. 
Article I section 28 (d) ("The Right-to-
Truth-in-Evidence"), by its very terms, 
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does not rescind any California consti-
tutional protections. All it purports to 
accomplish is the abrogation of an 
exclusionary remedy to enforce the 
substantive provisions of California'a 
independent state constitutional law. 
Independent California law is looked 
to but the theory in no way depends 
upon an exclusionary remedy to 
enforce California law. It does utilize 
the exclusionary rule-but only in the 
service of the Fourth Amendment. It 
must be re-emphasized that we are 
talking about federal rights here. 
California law becomes relevant only 
as a means of interpreting those rights. 
And, of course, pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution,30 the exclusionary rule 
for federal search and seizure law, 
made applicable to the states in Mapp 
v Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, can in no 
way be undermined by Proposition 8. 
Moving specifically to the Katz ques-
tion, it is fair to say that this is an area 
where the California Supreme Court 
has spoken frequently and forcefully. 
The Court has relied primarily upon 
Article 1 section 13 of the California 
Constitution3! (the state search and 
seizure provision) although "coexisten-
sive" authority has been found to 
emanate from California's Article 1 
section 1 right to privacy.32 (Indeed, at 
least two justices are of the opinion 
that Article 1 section 1 mandates even 
broader privacy protections than have 
been developed to date under tradi-
tional Article 1 section 13 analysis}.33 
Courts divided on privacy 
Whatever the basis, the case law is 
impressive. It undoubtedly marks the 
California Supreme Court's most 
striking division with the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the area of search and seizure 
law. The two courts are literally talking 
about different concepts of privacy. 
This is probably made clearest in the 
area of informational privacy. In the 
30U.S. Const. art VI, c1.2. 
31"The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable seizures and 
searches may not be violated; and a war-
rant may not issue except on probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons and things to 
be seized." 
32People v Crowson 33 Ca13d 623 at 629. 
33Id at pp. 638-639 (dissent by Bird with 
Reynoso concurring). 
area of bank records (Burrows v 
Superior Court (1974) 13 Ca13d 238), 
credit records (People v Blair (1979) 25 
Ca13d 640), and telephone records 
(Blair, supra and People v Chapman 
(1984) 36 Ca13d 98), the California 
Court has developed a theory of 
privacy that recognizes that the exi-
gencies of modern life require the 
individual to provide all sorts of 
personal data to numerous state and 
private bureaucracies; that in doing 
so, the individual has no realistic 
choice but to comply (only people in 
law school hypotheticals choose not to 
use banks, phones, credit cards, etc.); 
but that it is still reasonable for such 
a person to expect that those bureau-
cracies which have been given a 
glimpse of his or her personal life will 
use the data only for valid internal 
purposes rather than misuse it by dis-
closing it indiscriminately to the out-
side world for totally unrelated 
purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court, on 
the other hand has, to quote Chief 
Justice Bird of the California Supreme 
Court, "accepted the fiction that there 
is no expectation of privacy in bank 
records (Miller)34 or in outgoing tele-
phone call records (Smith)3s because 
the user voluntarily conveys this 
information to a third party-the bank 
(Miller) or the telephone company 
(Smith). As a result, the individual user 
assumes the risk that the third party 
will in turn disclose it to the police 
upon request." 36 
Clearly, such disparate theories of 
privacy cannot be reconciled. While 
the approach of the California Supreme 
Court provides the possibility of main-
taining some modicum of privacy in a 
world that is characterized by increas-
ing circulation and stockpiling of 
personal information, the approach of 
the U.S. Supreme Court has led Profes-
sor Yale Kamisar to observe that: 
"It is beginning to look as if the only way 
someone living in our society can avoid 
'assuming the risk' that various intermedi-
ary institutions will reveal information to 
the police is by engaging in drastic discipline 
characteristic of life under totalitarian 
regimes ... 37 
34U.S. v Miller (1976) 425 U.S. 435. 
35Smith v Md. (1979) 442 U.S. 735. 
36People v Chapman 36 Cal3d 98, 108. 
f.n.5. 
37Choper, Kamisar & Tribe, The Supreme 
Court: Trends and Developments, 1978-79 
at p. 143 (1979). 
This disparity is just as apparent in 
those areas other than informational 
privacy where the courts have been 
called upon to determine what consti-
tutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
For example, in People v Triggs (1973) 
8 Ca13d 884, and Smayda v U.s. (9th 
Cir., 1965) 352 F2d 25, we find the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court and the Ninth 
Circuit taking dramatically different 
positions on whether individuals 
charged with homosexual conduct in 
a public bathroom which was vacant 
(except for vice squad officers hidden 
in the walls) can be entitled to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from 
clandestine observations by 
policemen. 
The California Court observed that 
"Most persons using public restrooms have 
no reason to suspect that a hidden agent of 
the state will observe them. The expectation 
of privacy a person has when he enters a 
restroom is reasonable and not diminished 
because the toilet stall being used lacks a 
door. (Triggs, supra, at p. 891) 
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow 
California's lead, finding instead that 
the individuals assumed the risk-both 
because the stall was not completely 
enclosed and also apparently because 
people who "resort to such a public 
toilet for criminal purposes ... delib-
erately take the chance that they may 
be observed by police officers." 
(Smayda, supra, at p. 254). 
Garbage and privacy 
Trash cans and garbage form the 
backdrop of yet another independent 
application of the Katz doctrine by the 
California Supreme Court, In People v 
Krivda (1971) 5 Ca13d 357; vacated 409 
U.S. 33; reaffirmed 8 Ca13d 623 (1973), 
the Court declared that a householder 
retains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy against police rummaging 
through the contents of a trash can 
placed at the curb for collection. Most 
federal courts which have dealt with 
this issue have tended to find the trash 
as having been abandoned and the sub-
sequent police activity as not consti-
tuting a search. (See, for example, U.S. 
v Shelby (1978) 573 F2d 971). 
There is yet another significant area 
where the California Courts have taken 
a clearcut stand on the legitimacy of 
privacy expectations that conflicts 
directly with that espoused by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It involves the question 
of whether the Fourth Amendment 
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applies within a prison context-i.e. 
whether prisoners have any expectation 
of privacy that is reasonable. 
In the past, various pluralities of the 
u.s. Supreme Court have expressed 
grave doubts on this issue (see, for 
example, Lanza v New York (1962) 370 
U.S. 139 and Bell v Wolfish (1979) 441 
U.S. 520). This past term, however, a 
majority specifically held that 
"society is not prepared to recognize as 
legitimate any subjective expectations of 
privacy that a prisoner might have in his 
prison cell and . .. accordingly, the Fourth 
Amendment proscription against 
unreasonable searches and seizures does not 
apply within the confines of the prison 
cell. ''Hudson v Palmer (1984) 104 S.Ct. 3194 
at 3200. 
California, on the other hand, in 
DeLancie v Superior Court (1982) 31 
Cal3d 865 held that sections 2600 and 
2601 of the California Penal Code 
accord prison inmates a statutory 
right to privacy in prisons and jails 
that may not be abridged except "to 
provide for the reasonable security of 
the institution ... and for the 
reasonable protection of the public." 
Although it is obvious that those two 
exceptions contemplate substantial 
abridgement of the right, nonetheless, 
the Court did specifically hold that the 
county jail in question could therefore 
not monitor prisoners' conversations 
with visitors for the general purpose 
of gathering evidence for use in 
criminal proceedings, but rather only 
to maintain the security of the jail. 
The independent course of the 
California Courts with respect to the 
definition of privacy law in this area 
is as clear as it is dramatic. It acquires 
greater significance in light of the fact 
that the Court continues to move for-
ward in the development of this area 
(People v Chapman, supra, decided just 
this past summer reaffirms and ex-
pands upon the principles of Burrows, 
Blair, etc.)-whereas in other substan-
tive areas of search and seizure law, 
the Court shows signs of retreating to 
a federal standard without ever invok-
ing Proposition 8 (see for example, 
People v Superior Court (Valdez) (1983) 
35 Cal3d 11 and People v Chavers 
(1983) 33 Cal3d 462 which adopt the 
standard set out in U.S. v Ross (1982) 
456 U.S. 798 for warrantless car 
searches.) 
Current California cases 
The California Court currently has 
before it two cases which raise 
extremely difficult questions regarding 
application of these independently 
developed Katz principles: People v 
Mayoff, Crim 23608 and People v Cook, 
Crim 23651 each present the question 
of the reasonableness of privacy expec-
tations against aerial surveillance of 
marijuana fields. However the Court 
ultimately decides these specific 
cases, it is unlikely to retreat in any 
significant way from the coherent set 
of principles that it has developed in 
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this area-principles which have 
guided California privacy 
expectations for at least the last 
decade and a half and which we as 
California citizens have every right to 
rely upon as a source of legitimacy for 
our own subjective expectations under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
The theory we have been discussing 
would have a number of other signi-
ficant effects in California. Preeminent 
among these would be the possibility 
of tying California's constitutional 
right to privacy (Article 1, section 1, 
California Constitution) to federal 
search and seizure analysis. California 
has something which the federal 
constitution does not have-a specific 
protection of the "inalienable" right 
to privacy. It was placed in the consti-
tution by a vote of the electorate in 
1972. (For what its worth, it passed by 
a considerably greater electoral margin 
than did the initiative which produced 
Proposition 8. 38 If, as we have been 
saying, the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment depends upon which expectations 
of privacy society is prepared to accept 
as reasonable, here we have a situation 
where, quite literally, society has spo-
ken. Not only did they speak up to add 
privacy to the list of "inalienable" 
rights considered fundamental to a 
free people, but they did so in the con-
text of a ballot argument that is one 
of the most forceful condemnations of 
uncontrolled governmental surveillance 
one is likely to find anywhere. 
California decisions have long recog-
nized the propriety of looking to such 
election brochures as the equivalent 
of "legislative history" of initiative 
measures (see, for example, Carter v 
Com. on Qualifications, etc (1939) 14 
Cal2d 179). The California Supreme 
Court did this specifically with respect 
to the election brochure for Article 1 
section 1 (White v Davis (1975) 13 Cal 
§ 757, 775). In so doing, the Court in 
White quoted the following language 
directly from the election brochure as 
establishing some of the parameters 
of the right to privacy as it now exists 
in California: 
'~t present there are no effective restraints 
on the information activities of government 
38Privacy Admendent passed 62.9% to 
37.1%; Proposition 8 passed 56.4% to 
43.6%. Summary of Vote, Primary 
election, compiled by Secretary of State. 
',I 
and business. This amendment creates a 
legal and enforceable right of privacy for 
every Californian. " 
(Emphasis in original.) 
"The right of pnvacy is the right to be left 
alone. It is a fundamental and compelling 
interest. It protects our homes, our families, 
our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, 
our personalities, our freedom of commu-
nion and our freedom to associate with the 
people we choose. It prevents government 
and business interests from collecting and 
stockpiling unnecessary information about 
us and from misusing information about us 
and from misusing information gathered 
for one purpose in order to serve other pur-
poses or to embarrass us." (13 Ca13d at 774.) 
Needless to say, this language (as 
well as much of the rest of the election 
brochure) is noteworthy not only be-
cause of the vigor with which it cham-
pions the cause of personal privacy 
but also the specificity with which it 
disapproves of certain governmental 
conduct. 
Rather than leaving the Court to 
plumb its own vague intuitions as to 
what society might be prepared to 
tolerate, this document identifies the 
"principle mischiefs" associated with 
invasions of privacy so precisely that 
the Court felt compelled to list them: 
(1) "government snooping" and the secret 
gathering of personal information; (2) the 
overbroad collection and retention of unnec-
essary personal information by government 
and business interests; (3) the improper use 
of information properly obtained for a 
specific purpose, for example, the use of it 
for another purpose or the disclosure of it 
to some third party; and (4) the lack of a 
reasonable check on the accuracy of exis-
ting records. (13 Ca13d at 775.) 
Needless to say, it is quite difficult to 
reconcile "societal understandings" 
about privacy of this sort with the 
rationale that underlies the informa-
tional privacy cases of the U.S. 
Supreme Court (U_S. v Miller, supra, 
Smith v Maryland, supra, etc.). So too, 
the vast body of privacy law that the 
California Supreme Court has devel-
oped in interpreting Article 1, section 
1 conflicts directly with much of that 
of the United States Supreme Court 
(contrast, for example, Ciiy of Santa 
Barbara v Adamson (1980) 27 Ca13d 
123 with Village of Belle Terre v 
Boraas (1974) 416 U.S. Ion the issue 
of whether zoning regulations restrict-
ing the number of persons who may 
live together in a single household 
unit violate the right to privacy. If 
Article 1, section 1 has a role to play 
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here, then it may be a significant one 
indeed. 
It should probably be pointed out 
that the California Supreme Court has 
yet to rely upon Article 1, section 1 as 
the sole basis for exclusion in a sup-
pression context. However, as was 
noted earlier, a majority of the jus-
tices do concur that Article 1, section 
1 and Article 1, section 13 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution (as well as the 
Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution) are at least "coex-
tensive when applied to police surveil-
lance in the criminal context." (People 
v Crowsen, supra at p. 629). It is not 
exactly clear what is meant by this. It 
seems reasonable to infer that Justices 
Bird and Reynoso (who argue in dis-
sent that Article 1, section 1 expands 
privacy rights in the search and sei-
zure context) would vote to enforce 
the provision with an exclusionary 
remedy. What Justices Kaus and Mosk 
meant by the use of the term "coex-
tensive" in the plurality opinion is less 
clear. The most obvious interpretation 
would seem to be that Article 1, section 
1 provides parallel, co-equal authority 
for that body of privacy law that the 
Court has already developed in the 
search and seizure area-even though 
the Court has not seen fit to cite it in 
the past. This seems reasonable since 
the "mischiefs" toward which the 
right is directed are precisely those 
with which the Court has been con-
fronted in its Article 1, section 13 
privacy decisions (i.e. Burrows, Blair, 
Chapman, Triggs, etc.)-all of which 
have utilized an exclusionary remedy. 
Nevertheless, this is all somewhat 
beside the point. The theory that is 
before us does not require Article 1, 
section 1 to be enforced with an exclu-
sionary remedy. The exclusionary rule 
would be used to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment which would, in turn, be 
read in light of the policy underlying 
Article 1, section 1. 
Compelling interest 
One last speculative observation 
remains about the possible role for 
Article 1, section 1 if it were tied to 
Fourth Amendment scope theory, as 
the Court observed in White v Davis, 
supra, the election brochure "makes 
clear that the amendment does not 
purport to prohibit all incursion into 
individual privacy but rather that any 
such intervention must be justified by 
a compelling interest." (White v Davis 
at p. 775, emphasis added). That is not 
the language one traditionally finds in 
search and seizure literature and this 
may be what led two Justices in People 
v Crowsen (supra at p. 629, f.n. 5) to 
cast doubt upon its application in a 
traditional search and seizure case. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to specu-
late upon its possible application in 
such a context. Could compelling state 
interest theory (plus its traditional 
companion requirement that the 
government use the least drastic means 
to achieve its interest) serve as a basis 
for strengthening the warrant require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment, as 
applied in California? In other words, 
could one argue that Article 1, section 
1 demonstrates that California's citi-
zens consider privacy so important a 
value that they expect it to be violated 
only upon a showing of probable cause 
(the compelling interest) which has 
been demonstrated to a magistrate by 
application for a warrant (the least 
drastic means)? 
Moving back from the speculative 
to the concrete, one further area 
where the theory would seem to have 
obvious application would be in the 
area of standing-provided, that is, 
that the California Supreme Court 
decides in a case that is presently 
before it (in re Lance W., Crim. 23551) 
that Proposition 8 eliminates the 
"vicarious standing" rule in Califor-
nia. Whether Proposition 8 does, in 
fact, achieve this result is as arguable 
as its effect upon the exlcusionary 
rule in general. 
It is difficult to see how the theory 
is of any assistance in bolstering the 
argument for actual retention of the 
vicarious standing rule. As articulated 
in People v Martin (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 
755, and Kaplan v Superior Court 
(1971) 6 Cal3d 150, vicarious standing 
is based upon theories of greater 
deterrence and the imperative of 
judicial integrity-rather than any 
explicit theory of protecting privacy 
expectations. Privacy expectations 
really only become relevant once we 
have a standing requirement-as the 
principle factor in determining who 
has standing. Rakas v Illinois, supra. 
Law of standing 
The theory we have been examining 
would be of considerable significance, 
however, in interpreting the law of 
standing if it is found to be applicable 
once again in California. Let us take 
an example from the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions in this area 
and analyze it in light of the assump-
tion that California's privacy laws 
would have some bearing on the core 
question. 
In Rawlings v Kentucky (1980) 448 
U.S. 98, petitioner placed a large quan-
tity of drugs in the purse of a female 
companion named Cox (apparently with 
her consent) just prior to the arrival 
of six police officers. In holding that 
petitioner has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his companion's 
purse (which was subsequently 
searched), the Court relied on the 
following factors: 1) that Rawlings had 
known Cox for only a few days; 2) that 
"petitioner had never sought or 
received access to her purse prior to 
that sudden bailment," 3) that 
petitioner did not, "have any right to 
exclude other persons from access to 
Cox's purse" and the fact that a third 
person had access to the purse earlier 
in the day; 4) the precipitous nature of 
the transaction and 5) the fact that 
Rawlings admitted he had no subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in Cox's 
purse because he admitted at the 
suppression hearing that he thought 
the police might search Ms. Cox's 
purse. 
Before analyzing this in terms of 
California's independent tradition of 
privacy it should first be noted that 
several of the factors Rehnquist relied 
upon in Rawlings might loosely be 
referred to as concepts of property 
law. Remembering that a state's inde-
pendent property law may be as impor-
tant as its privacy law in providing a 
source outside the Fourth Amendment 
for the legitimization of privacy expec-
tations (Rakas v Illinois, supra at 143-
44 n. 12), the first point should be that 
it is clear that California property law 
contemplates that an enforceable bail-
ment can be created between total 
strangers.39 Moreover, first time bail-
ments are every bit as enforceable as 
continuing or subsequent ones.40 Thus, 
in California it is much less signifi-
cant that Rawlings had not "sought or 
received access to her purse" 
preViously. 
The primary factor in Rehnquist's 
analysis, however, seems to be Raw-
lings' lack of exclusive control over 
3'See 3 Witkin, Summary of Ca. Law, 8th 
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the purse, i.e., the fact that he did not 
have the right to exclude others from 
access to it as well as the fact that 
another individual had had access to 
the purse earlier in the day. Such 
exclusive control is simply not neces-
sary to establish a protectable privacy 
interest in California. The privacy 
tradition which has developed with 
great clarity in such cases as Burrows, 
Blair and Chapman and which is 
bolstered emphatically by the legis-
lative history of Article 1, section 1 is 
one which contemplates that simply 
because an individual sacrifices some 
degree of privacy with respect to one 
individual or agency does not mean 
that he has abandoned any and all 
claims of privacy with respect to the 
entire world. It is difficult to see how 
Rawlings' act of putting drugs in 
Cox's purse is any different from Mr. 
Burrows putting his money in the 
Bank of America. In California, each 
has a reasonable expectation that the 
government will stay out. 
The last important factor in the case 
was Rawlings' frank admission that 
he did not believe that Cox's purse 
would remain free from governmental 
intrusion, thus evincing an absence of 
any subjective expectation of privacy 
on his part. As Professor Wayne 
LaFave has pointed out, "The 
question (as set forth in footnote 3 of 
the opinion) quite obviously asks the 
defendant what he thought was going 
to happen after the police were on the 
scene and after they had told him and 
the others that a warrant was being 
sought ... But if one can be deprived 
of Fourth Amendment standing by 
being informed in advance by the 
police of the intrusion they intend to 
make then it is certainly correct, as 
the Rawlings dissenters complained, 
that the majority "has turned the 
development of the law of search and 
seizure on its head." 41 Once again 
California law is critical precisely 
because it has not been turned on its 
head in this fashion. As the California 
Supreme Court held in DeLancie v 
Superior Court, supra, at p. 876, 
"Privacy is not safe if a search or 
intrusion can be justified merely by 
proof that the state announced its 
intention in advance. This court recog-
nized in People v Hyde (1974) 12 Ca13d 
41LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise 
on The Fourth Amendment (pp. 192-96 
of 1983 pocket part to Vol. 3, §11.3). 
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158, that 'such a concept would 
sanction an erosion of the Fourth 
Amendment by the simple and expe-
dient device of its universal violation.' " 
Thus, although Mr. Rawlings may 
not have standing in Kentucky, if the 
court interprets the Rakas expectation 
of privacy standard in light of Cali-
fornia's independent body of privacy 
and property 'law, there is a strong 
argument to be made that he would 
have standing for Fourth Amendment 
purposes in California. 
Privacy statutes 
One last area where the theory we 
have been discussing might have direct 
application is with respect to the vast 
array of statutory law that the Califor-
nia legislature has enacted over the 
years in order to protect the privacy 
expectations of its citizens. We have, 
in fact, already seen an example of how 
this might work when we looked at 
DeLancie v Superior Court, supra. 
Although the Court there was not faced 
with the larger question of how Cali-
fornia statutes might affect the scope 
of federal constitutional law, it none-
theless had no difficulty in utilizing 
sections 2600 and 2601 of the Penal 
code to determine the Katz question 
for purposes of California law. A more 
expansive use of California statutes to 
determine the scope of federal rights 
would seem equally appropriate. 
California's statutory privacy protec-
tions are, in many ways, as impressive 
as the protections we have examined 
in other contexts. For example, Califor-
nia has the oldest wire tapping prohi-
bition in the world. It prohibited the 
interception of telegraph messages in 
1862.42 Telephone wiretapping was 
first prohibited in 190543 and today 
the entire area is regulated by the 
Invasion of Privacy Act (Cal. P.C. § 
§630 to 637.5). The Privacy Act covers 
much of the same territory as Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Street Act of 1968 (18 U.S.c. § 
§251O-2520) although it differs in at 
least two crucial respects: 1) subject 
to a law enforcement exception, the 
state act requires all parties to consent 
to warrantless interceptions of 
telephone conversations while the 
federal act permits such interception 
where the consent of only one party 
has been obtained (People v Conklin 
(1974) 12 Ca13d 259, 270; and 2) it 
42Dash, supra at p.8. 
43Id at p. 8. 
appears that California has not 
authorized the interception of 
communications by warrant while 
Title III provides express approval for 
such law enforcement activity (People 
v Conklin, supra at p. 271. f.n. 10). 
Another example of an expansive 
statutory scheme protecting privacy 
may be found in the area of financial 
records. California privacy rights in 
this area are provided protection 
through the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act (Government Code sections 7460-
7493, plus amendments to several 
other codes). (Federal regulation may 
be found in the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-508,84 Stat. 114 
et seq.)). 
The potential conflicts between 
these last two sets of legislation serve 
to illustrate the last major issue which 
is raised by the theory we have been 
examining. This concerns the question 
of whether the utilization of state law 
in the manner we have been discussing 
might run afoul of the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. So long as we are talking solely 
about its application in California 
courts, the answer seems to be implicit 
within the theory itself. The basic 
presupposition is that state law is 
part of the federallaw-Le., that the 
Fourth Amendment incorporates the 
corresponding state law to define its 
scope. If state law is, in fact, part of 
the federal law then it can hardly be 
in conflict and supremacy clause 
issues are of little or no concern. 
The real problem is that our theory 
carries us much further. Precisely 
because it purports to explicate 
federal law, it leads us to the conclu-
sion that it must be applied in federal 
courts sitting in California and it 
must control the actions of federal 
officials operating in that state. Thus, 
for example, federal law enforcement 
officers would be bound by-among 
other things-the wiretapping pro-
visions of the California Privacy Act. 
While the thought that the states 
might establish rules governing the 
actions of the F.B.I. and the appli-
cation of federal law in federal courts 
might look somewhat attractive in a 
state with a progressive tradition such 
as California, such a concept does 
nonetheless seem to run counter to 
traditional approaches regarding the 
appropriate allocation of power 




There is neither sufficient time nor 
space here to explore fully the implica-
tions of such an application of the 
theory to federal court practice. It is 
suggested, however, that there are at 
least three separate ways that the 
issue might be dealt with in a suffi-
ciently principled manner so as not to 
undermine the primary objective, 
which is its application in state courts. 
The first approach would be to say 
the theory simply does not apply in 
federal court-that what is required 
in federal court by way of the Fourth 
Amendment need not be identical to 
that which is required in state court 
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There has been a strain of incorpora-
tion doctrine represented most recently 
by Justice Harlan's dissent in Williams 
v Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 (the 6 
person jury case) and Justice Powell's 
concurrence in Apodaca v Oregon 
(1972) 406 U.S. 404 (the non-unanimous 
jury verdict case) which maintains 
that federal rights imposed upon the 
states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment need not mirror the federal 
right in every detail. This approach 
has not commanded a majority since 
the Warren Court abandoned the 
"fundamental fairness" standard of 
incorporation doctrine in the early 
1960's. Nonetheless, it also has not 
been considered in light of an approach 
such as ours where the "freedom to 
experiment" accorded to the states 
would be considered only where the 
states have chosen to provide greater 
protection to individual liberties 
rather than less. 
The second possible approach is the 
neatest conceptually but the least 
likely to succeed. This approach would 
be identical to the one we utilize in 
state court and would maintain that 
since any state law we look to is part 
of the Fourth Amendment, there is no 
supremacy clause problem. If the 
theory requires an F.B.I. agent to 
follow the guidelines of the California 
statutes regulating wiretapping rather 
than Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control Act, that is only because the 
policies underlying the California act 
have become part of the Fourth 
Amendment (when the latter is applied 
in California) and certainly a congres-
sional statute such as Title III is 
subordinate to the United States 
Constitution (Marbury v Madison 
(1803) U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178. While 
this is interesting as a theoretical 
conceit, at least to the extent that it 
subordinates congressional regulation 
of federal law enforcement goals and 
operations to the will of the individual 
states, it seems to contradict every 
traditional concept of the supremacy 
clause and the pre-emption doctrine. 
court but that it is subject to 
traditional preemption analysis when 
the predicate state law conflicts with 
acts of Congress. To the extent that 
the state law conflicts with prior 
Supreme Court decisions on the scope 
question it would merely supplement 
them and become part of a more fully 
explicated Fourth Amendment. But to 
the extent that state law actually 
The last approach would contend 
that the theory applies in federal 
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conflicts with an act of Congress 
intended to regulate criminal activity 
on a national level, it might obstruct 
federal law enforcement policy in a 
way prohibited by traditional applica-
tion of the preemption doctrine (see, 
for example, Pennsylvania v Nelson 
(1956) 350 U.S. 497. 
To say that pre-emption theory 
might apply is not to say that it 
prevents our looking to state law 
whenever there is federal legislation 
in the field. Pre-emption issues depend 
heavily upon determinations of legis-
lative intent and tend to lead to 
considerable judicial ad hoc balan-
cing. Thus, the result in any given 
case is often far from clear-cut. For 
example, we might briefly consider 
the effect of the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970, supra, upon the utilization of 
the banking aspects of Califiornia's 
information privacy law as part of 
our theory. To the extent that the Act 
requires banks to maintain certain 
customer records, specifically for the 
purpose of facilitating federal tax and 
regulatory investigations, it might be 
viewed as undermining the principles 
espoused in Burrows, supra. However, 
both the legislative history of the act 
and the regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto make specific 
reference to the fact that access to the 
records is to be controlled by legal 
process. Since that is all that Burrows 
requires, one could argue that at least 
this part of the Act does not preempt 
California law. Needless to say, if the 
courts look favorably upon the theory 
in general there will be plenty of time 
to develop any pre-emption 
implications it might present. 
Theory a Longshot 
As should now be obvious, the princi-
ple problem with this theory is that 
the final arbiters of its validity sit on 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, to 
the extent it is novel and ultimately 
redounds to the benefit of persons 
accused of crime, it must realistically 
be assessed as a longshot. 
But before we reject it as being 
totally unrealistic, it is worth pausing 
to look at the authority upon which it 
rests. 
With virtually no exceptions, every 
U.S. Supreme Court case that it relies 
upon has been authored by either one 
of the moderates or conservatives of 
the Court. Furthermore, the theory 
really is a conservative one at its core 
-at least to the extent that states' 
rights and notions of federalism are 
still viewed as being conservative in 
concept. 
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Moreover, it is increasingly obvious 
that the present majority is engaged 
in a process of taking the federal 
courts out of the business of protec-
ting federal rights. Along the way, they 
keep suggesting that states retain the 
power to pick up the slack-either in 
terms of traditional independent state 
ground theory or, more recently, by 
actually defining the scope of federal 
rights as they are given application 
within the particular states' borders. 
Whether this latter concept is merely 
rhetoric intended to muffle the sound 
of courthouse doors slamming shut or 
whether it is a sincere invitation to 
state action remains to be seen. But it 
is clear that to the extent personal 
liberties are to receive any meaningful 
protection in the near future, it is the 
states which must take the lead. In 
the independent state ground area an 
impressive array of state courts are 
breaking ranks with the U.S. Supreme 
Court to do just that. California has, 
of course, been at the forefront of this 
battle. This article suggests a way in 
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countermeasure such as Proposition 
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